College of Saint Benedict and Saint John's University

DigitalCommons@CSB/SJU
Clemens Lecture Series

Clemens Series

2010

Reconciling the Science and Economics of Climate Change
Eban Goodstein
Bard Center for Environmental Policy

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.csbsju.edu/clemens_lectures
Part of the Economics Commons, and the Environmental Sciences Commons

Recommended Citation
Goodstein, Eban, "Reconciling the Science and Economics of Climate Change" (2010). Clemens Lecture
Series. 18.
https://digitalcommons.csbsju.edu/clemens_lectures/18

This Presentation is brought to you for free and open access by DigitalCommons@CSB/SJU. It has been accepted
for inclusion in Clemens Lecture Series by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@CSB/SJU. For more
information, please contact digitalcommons@csbsju.edu.

C L E M E N S L E C T U R E S E R I E S 2 0 10

22

Reconciling the Science
and Economics of
Climate Change
Eban Goodstein
Bard Center for Environmental Policy

22

C L E M E N S L E C T U R E S E R I E S 2 0 10

Reconciling the Science
and Economics of
Climate Change
Eban Goodstein
Bard Center for Environmental Policy

Eban Goodstein is Director of the Bard Center for Environmental Policy. He
holds a Ph.D. in economics from the University of Michigan, and a bachelors
degree in geology from Williams College. He has taught at both Lewis & Clark
College and Skidmore College.
His books include Economics and the Environment, Fighting for Love in the
Century of Extinction: How Passion and Politics Can Stop Global Warming,
and The Trade-off Myth: Fact and Fiction About Jobs and the Environment. Dr.
Goodstein has published in a wide variety of scholarly journals (including
The Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Scientific American,
Land Economics, Ecological Economics, and Environmental Management) and
newspapers (including The New York Times, The Washington Post, Time, The
Economist, USA Today, and The Chronicle of Higher Education).
Dr. Goodstein directs two national educational initiatives on global warming:
C2C (Campus2Congress) and The National Climate Seminar. A strong public
speaker, he has coordinated climate education events at over 2,500 colleges,
universities, high schools and other institutions across the country.

Reconciling the Science and
Economics of Climate Change
Eban Goodstein

Bard Center for Environmental Policy

It’s been hot here this week in Minnesota – record breaking. Across the U.S.,
record high temperatures are outpacing record lows by 6-1. And globally, the first
nine months of 2010 have been the hottest in human civilization. It’s hot and it
is going to get hotter. Today’s young people will live through a global warming of
4 degrees F; and depending on our actions in the next decade, that number could
stabilize, or rise to 10 or 11 degrees F.
Those are the underlying facts. But there is a wide gulf between some prominent
economists and the scientific community on the right response to global warming.
IPCC chair Rajendra Pachuari argues that we have only a few short years to act
aggressively, to get on a trajectory to cut heat-trapping emissions 80% by 2050.
Meanwhile, some economists advocate a “start-slow, ramp-up” policy, that would
allow emissions to increase by 50% over the same period.
Perhaps nowhere is the contrast between scientists and economists as great as
in the dueling metaphors governing the impact of high end warming: “Collapse”
(following Jared Diamond) versus “Reductions in the Rate of Growth” (following all standard integrated assessment models in economics, including those of
Nicholas Stern and the IPCC).
By way of reference, mid-range estimates of business-as-usual warming are
currently around 4 degrees C. During the last Ice Age, global temperatures were
only 4.5 degree C colder then they are today. Many climate scientists, I would
argue, believe that high end warming (> 4 degrees C) will likely impoverish much
of humanity.
By contrast, economic models calmly integrate this warming of greater than Ice
Age magnitude, only in the opposite direction, into scenarios assuming continued
growth, albeit at reduced levels. Sir Nicholas Stern, for example, working on behalf
of the UK government, provided an integrated estimate of the costs of climate
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change, forecasting likely reductions in global output as high as 20% below the
baseline. This is a big number, justifying immediate and large cuts in emissions
on a benefit-cost basis.
And yet, even for Stern, that baseline assumes steady economic growth of 1.3%
per capita, implying that by 2200, people on the planet will be 12 times as wealthy
as they are today. Ackerman notes that even assuming what Stern characterizes
as an extreme worst case scenario – a 35% reduction in income below baseline
– then the world would “only” be 8 times richer in 2200. Similarly, the IPCC’s
four “marker scenarios” all forecast developing country per capita GDP to equal
that of industrial countries in 1990, beginning in 2050 (scenario A1B), to out
beyond 2100 (scenario A2).
Why no collapse? Economists are acutely aware of a powerful history of a century and a half of economic growth. Tracing the course of GDP, calamities such
as the Great Depression, major regional wars, global epidemics like AIDs, or the
recent burst in the global housing bubble barely put a dent in long run growth.
The default assumption is that capitalism will march relentlessly on, regardless of
climate change (or peak oil, or fresh water and top soil shortages). Sidestepping the
issue of whether continued economic growth enhances welfare, the conventional
economist’s position seems well-grounded in historical experience.
Against this record, one school of economists – ecological economists – have
developed a sophisticated neo-Malthusian response: that high population and
growing affluence mean the future will not be like the past, and that the economics
of a full planet make continued global economic growth untenable. As a book of
cautionary tales, Diamond’s Collapse presents lesson after lesson of how resource
constraints, married with an inadequate policy response, cascaded into political
crisis and undermined the economic foundations of pre-industrial societies. And
yet this perspective – a high likelihood of collapse – has not gained much currency
among mainstream economics.
Collapse versus slower than business-as-usual growth reflects a paradigmatic difference between physical science and economics regarding the impact of climate
change. Even so, among economists, there are some working to close the gap – and
others seeking to keep it as wide as possible.

Estimating the Costs of Climate Change
A good way to illustrate the range of opinion is through different economists’
estimates of the “social cost of carbon” – the global warming damages arising from
the emission of an additional ton of carbon dioxide (CO2). Richard Tol and Wil-
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liam Nordhaus, at one end, view economic damages arising from the emission of
a ton of carbon dioxide to range from the low teens to negative – meaning that
global warming might actually yield net benefits! (More on this below). Stern, and
American economists like Frank Ackerman, derive estimates closer to $100 a ton.
The Nordhaus/Tol $10 tax per ton of carbon dioxide implies an increase in the
price of gas of about a dime – in other words, don’t worry, be happy. The Stern/
Ackerman view of $100 per ton implies the need for an immediate steep increase
in the price of gas of $1 to reflect the underlying true social costs.
The climate debate between scientists, and among different camps of economists,
is not about the likely physical effects of high end warming. These impacts are
incorporated into all economic models. Rather, the differences emerge as different
economists focus on the costs of climate change that their models can measure.
What will the economic impact be of a given temperature increase? Calculating the social cost of carbon requires projections of the costs incurred by rising
temperatures to the global economy, projections made over the next 100 years for
temperatures outside the range of human experience. Impact estimates for a given
amount of warming vary significantly.
Richard Tol (2008), the original developer of the FUND integrated assessment
model, points out that:
...cost estimates omit some impacts of climate change; they tend to ignore
interactions between different impacts, and neglect higher order effects
on the economy and population; they rely on extrapolation from a few
detailed case studies; they often impose a changing climate on a static
society; they use simplistic models of adaptation to climate change; they
often ignore uncertainties; and they use controversial valuation methods
and benefit transfers.
To illustrate this complexity, compare the baseline cost estimates for the United
States for one of the major integrated assessment models, DICE, developed by
economist William Nordhaus (2008) at Yale, with an alternate set of estimates
recommended by University of California – Berkeley economist Michael Hanemann. Hanemann (2010) provides a category-by-category critique of Nordhaus,
and recommends increasing the DICE baseline estimates by a factor of 4. The
figures reported here are for a 4.5°C warming above 1990 levels.
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Nordhaus (DICE)

Hanemann

$6
$0
$0
$9

$23
$8
$15
$53

Non-Market Impacts
Health, Water Quality, Human Life
Human Amenity, Recreation, Leisure
Human Settlements and Ecosystems
Extreme and Catastrophic Events

$3
-$26
$9
$38

$15
$-8
$17
$38

Total
Excluding Extreme and Catastrophic

$39
$1

$161
$123

Market Impacts
Agriculture
Engergy
Water
Sea Level

Table 1. Annual US Economic Impacts of a 2.5˚C Warming, in $2008 Billions. Sources:
Nordhaus, 2008 and Hanemann, 2010.

This comparison begs many questions, and is used here primarily to illustrate
that Nordhaus’s DICE model is conservative in many of its underlying assumptions about climate change impacts when compared with the Hanemann model.
Excluding the category of “Extreme and Catastrophic Events” (measured as annual
national willingness to pay for insurance against the possibility of catastrophic
events such as rapid sea level rise). Nordhaus’s net overall annual U.S. cost estimate
is $1 billion – smaller than a rounding error in today’s $14 trillion U.S. economy.
Part of the reason for this low estimated cost is that Nordhaus assumes large
recreational and amenity benefits ($26 billion) from warmer weather; for example,
more good golf days. Beyond that, his cost estimates by category are all in the
low billions of dollars. Given that western U.S. water supplies are expected to
be dramatically impacted by declining snowpack, Nordhaus’s assertion of a zero
dollar figure for that category is surprising. Given likewise that a 4.5°C warming
is anticipated to drive 20–30 percent of the species on the planet into extinction, including via accelerated acidification of oceans, the figure of $9 billion for
ecosystems and human settlements combined also seems low (IPCC, 2007). The
disparity between Nordhaus’s and Hanemann’s estimates provides a sense of the
challenge economists face in estimating the impacts of future climate change.
Uncertainty in the temperature-damage function is natural, because we do not
fully understand the physical changes to the planet that will result from a given
temperature increase. Consider for example the two estimates in Table 1 for sealevel rise costs: $6 versus $25 billion. Plausible estimates of sea-level rise during
this century – due to thermal expansion of seawater, melting of temperate glaciers,
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and the potential collapse of the Greenland and West Antarctic Ice Sheets – range
from a manageable tens of centimeters to a truly devastating two meters (Pfeffer
et al., 2008).
Serious sectoral analysis of high-end warming impacts are few. One example
is Nicholls et al. (2008), who explore the case of a 5-meter, 100-year sea-level
rise resulting from a hypothetical, rapid collapse of the Greenland and/or West
Antarctic Ice Sheets. Some 400 million people currently live in land that would
be potentially inundated. Actual inundation and relocation would depend on the
degree of coastal protection initiated. The authors suggest that coastal protection of
up to 50% would be justified on a benefit cost basis, reducing actual displacement
to fewer than 15 million people over 100 years. Now this conclusion is hedged by
several caveats, most prominently, that in some countries the costs of protection
would rise prohibitively, to above 1% of GDP, and that Katrina (and add the BP
blowout) show that optimal defensive investments are seldom made. Nevertheless,
the paper has a startling bottom-line that is very, very far from collapse: a five-meter,
rapid sea level rise might imply displacement of only 150,000 people per year, on
average. Nothing worse here then your average earthquake year.
To sum up: economic analyses that model marginal changes have a hard time
grappling with the economics of disaster. That said, academic economists nevertheless have waded in, and do tend to be aware of the limitations of their modeling
exercises, providing appropriate caveats in the text. But those caveats often disappear
from the bottom line policy purposes to which such studies are put. Thus we get
the projections of continued future economic growth from the IPCC, and Stern.
Beyond trying to assess and price the actual physical damages – some mitigated
through adaptation – that humans will face in a hotter world, economic estimates
of the social cost of carbon also are highly sensitive to the analyst’s choice of the
discount rate used in their models.

Discounting the costs of climate change
Briefly, economists generally measure future benefits and costs in present value
terms, as the amount of money that would have to be invested today at the going
rate of return to generate a comparable cost or benefit in the future. Discounting
is integral to decision-making in a cost-benefit framework, but is problematic
over long-time horizons.
In the case of global warming, the argument for discounting is as follows. Preventing impacts from CO2 emissions – for example by building a sea-wall or investing
in solar energy – bears an opportunity cost. The incremental dollars spent on sea

5

walls or solar panels might have built a school or financed research and development
in new pharmaceuticals. Discounting future climate costs insures that society does
not over-invest today in stabilizing the climate, but instead weighs those investments equally with other investments of potential benefit to future generations.
The argument for discounting is most persuasive when analyzing the benefits and
costs of projects with a time-horizon occurring within a single investor’s lifetime,
such as a 30-year mortgage. However, a ton of CO2 released today will continue
to impose economic costs for at least 100 years. Discounting truly does “discount”
costs that are incurred in the future. Costs of $100 that occur at the end of this
century are reduced to a present value of $40.90 at a discount rate of 1 percent,
$7.00 at 3 percent, and only $1.20 at 5 percent.
For short-time horizon cost assessments, discount rates of 3 to 5 percent are
reasonable; they often reflect the foregone opportunity costs of investing dollars
in one area and not another. When discounting at 5 percent, however, a logic
that tells us not to spend $1.20 today to prevent, in 90 years, $100 in economic
costs to our descendants is troubling to most people, including many economists.
Discount rates that rise above 3 percent result in analyses that dramatically reduce
the present value of any costs to people or the planet beyond a 30 to 40 year time
horizon, largely excluding climate impacts on future generations from the costbenefit calculus.
Lack of intergenerational equity may be the best-known and most intuitive
criticism of the use of high discount rates for long-time horizon analyses. This
concern has been reinforced by numerous economic studies focusing on a number
of other technical issues. Given these problems, the U.S. EPA (2008) concludes:
A review of the literature indicates that rates of three percent or lower are
more consistent with conditions associated with long-run uncertainty in
economic growth and interest rates, inter-generational considerations, and
the risk of high impact climate damages (which could reduce or reverse
economic growth).
In spite of the many persuasive arguments against the use of high discount rates,
Tol and Nordhaus continue to advocate for the use of 5% discount rates. And in
fact, in Tol’s FUND Model, the use of a 5% rate typically results in a estimate of
the social cost of carbon of less than zero – implying that global warming will yield
positive net benefits to human society from business-as-usual global warming, i.e.,
around 3°C over current temperatures by 2100.
This rather surprising result emerges because FUND assumes large positive
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impacts from mild global warming in the early years, that are later overwhelmed
by economic costs as the earth’s atmosphere continues to warm up. However, at
the 5 percent discount rate, the later impacts and costs are more than offset by the
early benefits, leading the model to conclude that humans are better off, on net,
with business-as-usual global warming. DICE has a similar structure with large
initial benefits. In its latest iteration, however, the model finds that at a 5 percent
discount rate business-as-usual global warming has positive, but very small, net
costs. What are these up-front benefits?
As noted above, DICE assumes large amenity and leisure benefits from the early
stages of warming – for example, people will have longer fall and spring seasons
for outdoor recreation. FUND includes an assumption that on net, a reduction in
cold-related deaths will greatly outweigh an increase in heat-related deaths. FUND’s
designer, Richard Tol (2008), and co-authors have argued that a 1°C increase in
the global mean temperature would save, on net, more than 800,000 lives a year
by 2050. Both models also assume that agriculture will initially benefit from CO2
fertilization and longer growing seasons, before eventually experiencing net costs.
DICE assumes that human enjoyment of the weather is maximized at a yearround average temperature of 20°C. As Ackerman et al. (2009b) note: “. . . this
is roughly the temperature of Houston or New Orleans, cities where anyone who
can afford it uses air conditioning for most of the year; it is well above the current
global average temperature of about 14.5°C.” Redhanz and Madison (2005) find
that outside of the most northern countries, there will be few amenity benefits
from even the first few decades of warming.
Regarding the health benefit estimates in FUND, Ackerman and Stanton (2008)
demonstrate that their existence depends on the questionable assumption that
humans would not adapt to local temperature changes. Finally, the magnitude
of alleged agricultural benefits has been challenged by Schenkler et al. (2005),
Hanneman (2010), and others.
This debate over whether or not large benefits from global warming exist in
the short-term brings us back to the difficulty of specifying temperature-damage
functions and provides yet another example of the perverse impacts of high discount rates.
Even assuming that the amenity, health and short-term agricultural benefits
identified by Nordhaus and Tol are real, the 5 percent discount rate clearly
privileges these short-term net benefits enjoyed by the current generation, as the
planet warms slightly, over longer term net costs imposed on our grandchildren
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and generations to follow, as the earth heats up dramatically. The result is a model
outcome arguing the counterintuitive case that unchecked global warming will,
on balance, benefit humanity.
To sum up: deriving a social cost of carbon is a horrendously assumption-laden
exercise, both in terms of guessing the many sectoral costs of climate change
across a whole range of potential temperature increases, and then in choosing the
discount rate.
That said, and staying within the dominant economic framework that assumes
continued global economic growth, it is nevertheless possible to argue a strong
economic case for sharp near-term reductions in global warming pollution, with a
goal of stabilizing at a 2 degree C warming. Economic models that assume continued growth – but also, low discount rates, high business-as-usual emissions, high
climate sensitivity, and a high temperature damage function – generate estimates
for the social cost of carbon of greater than $100 per ton, consistent with strategies
that force a near term peak in global CO2 emissions and support cuts in carbon
of 80% by mid-century.

Collapse, Growth and Insurance
Is there a role for actual collapse in economic modeling? Harvard’s Martin
Weitzman provides a useful metaphor for high-end warming (>4 degrees C): it
will leave humanity inhabiting “a terra incognita biosphere.” In an unrecognizable
bio-physical world, continued global economic growth is possible – it is hubris to
categorically assert otherwise– but Diamond-like catastrophic outcome would also
seem to have uncomfortably high probabilities, especially for regional economies.
Science suggests that high-end warming does have this kind of probability under
business-as-usual pollution – well into the double digits. Under these circumstances,
rather than think about the optimal amount of pollution as determined by the
“right” carbon price, it is better to consider investments in climate stability as a
form of insurance.
If growth continues, this insurance will be quite cheap: colleagues and I have
shown that very aggressive climate policy, targeting CO2 levels of 350 ppm by the
end of the century, would likely divert about 3% of GDP per year from consumption
to investment. In a world economy growing on a per capita basis at 1.3% per year,
that would mean our descendants in 2075 could inherit a clean energy economy
and a stable climate, but have to wait two and a half years, until the middle of
2077 to be as rich otherwise as they would have been on a dirty energy trajectory.
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If climate catastrophes do emerge under business-as-usual – reversing growth in
some regions or perhaps globally – then, of course, this insurance investment in
the form of a world rewired with clean energy, would pay off in spades.
When climate scientists venture into policy, it is often with reference to the
biblical hell and high-water that high-end warming will unleash: floods, droughts,
famine, fire, plague, mass extinction. Will economic growth continue through
these turmoils? Here is where economists and scientists differ. But even if there is
a 90% chance that growth continues, and a 10% chance of collapse, the standard
economic answer would be: buy insurance to reduce the odds of catastrophe. In
turn, the underlying assumption of long run growth makes that insurance quite
affordable. Bottom line: by balancing the risks of economic collapse against the
powerful engine of global growth, insurance investments in climate security can
reconcile economic and scientific perspectives on climate change.
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